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While extant research acknowledges the importance of information for corporate political 
activity (CPA), there is limited understanding of how information is actually used to deploy 
political strategies. This gap reflects a broader problem in the literature whereby Big Data 
(BD) research is overly focused on the impact of information on market performance but 
overlooks the impact on nonmarket performance. In this paper, we draw on the resource-
based view to conceptualize the interrelationship between BD (i.e. information) and CPA. 
We argue that CPA motivates BD investments, which, in turn, shape the organization of CPA 
and spur the development of data-driven political capabilities. Our conceptual model, which 
unpacks the intricate linkages between CPA success factors, BD and political capabilities, 
generates important theoretical, practical and further research implications.  
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Big Data (BD hereafter) is regarded as today’s Digital Oil (Yi et al., 2014) or the New Raw 
Material of the 21st century (Berners-Lee and Shadbolt, 2011). It is believed to create Big 
Value for firms (Braganza et al., 2017; Sivarajah et al., 2017), and has thus attracted the 
attention of practitioners and academics alike (George et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2018). 
Existing BD research, in search of instrumentality, has mainly focused on articulating the 
benefits of data. Some scholars argue that BD exposes managers to new knowledge and 
makes them agile in exploiting real-time opportunities or responding to emerging threats and 
challenges (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012; Sivarajah et al., 2017). BD also enables firms to 
make informed decisions (Bhimani, 2015; Chen and Zhang, 2014; Janssen et al., 2017), 
develop business intelligence (Castellanos et al., 2012; Chen, H. et al., 2012), increase 
innovation (Chen and Zhang, 2014), improve profitability (Akter et al., 2016) and gain 
competitive advantage (Kubina et al., 2015; Wamba et al., 2017).  
Essentially, researchers are increasingly exploring the market value of BD for firms 
(Barton and Court, 2012; Mazzei and Noble, 2017; Sheng et al., 2017; Wamba et al., 2017). 
While this trajectory has unquestionable merits, it overlooks other issues. First, despite the 
ubiquity of BD research, there is relative muteness about its antecedents, thus creating the 
impression that BD capabilities or strategies are developed or deployed from a vacuum. This 
is entrenched by a forward-leaning stance whereby researchers treat BD as the starting point 
of organizational outcomes. For instance, Janssen et al. (2017) present data collection as the 
beginning of the BD chain. Similarly, George et al. (2016), in their discussion of the 
challenges BD poses to management scholars, start from data generation and collection. 
Further, Blazquez and Domenech (2018) propose a BD lifecycle that starts with planning and 
data collection. The key question emerging from such representations is, what determines 
whether firms collect BD? In other words, what drives BD collection? 
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Moreover, extant research conceives BD as an enterprise asset (Braganza et al., 2017; 
Nguyen et al., 2017) and has been mainly concerned with its impact on firm performance. In 
this respect, studies have concentrated on market outcomes such as profitability, market 
share, and customer satisfaction, while relegating the effects of data on nonmarket outcomes. 
This problem curtails a comprehensive understanding of BD effects on overall firm 
performance - a function of both market and nonmarket performances. It is worth noting that 
businesses do not only operate in market environments, but they also operate in nonmarket 
environments (Baron, 1995a; 1999; 2003)1. The importance of nonmarket environments 
cannot be overemphasized, mainly as they wield significant influences on market 
attractiveness and potential (Mellahi et al., 2016; Doh et al., 2012). Therefore, understanding 
the usefulness of BD in nonmarket environments will help to extend our appreciation of data 
for developing nonmarket strategies, especially corporate political activity (CPA hereafter). 
CPA, which refers to firms’ actions to influence their political environments 
(Hillman, A. J. et al., 2004), has strong links with BD. First, CPA relies on information 
(Lawton et al., 2013a; Brown, 2017). For instance, some CPA scholars have conceptualized 
information as a political strategy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Others have articulated the 
usefulness of information for orchestrating political strategies (Figueiredo, 2002; Lawton et 
al., 2014). Importantly, information also happens to be the core motivation for BD 
investments (Sheng et al., 2017; Sivarajah et al., 2017). Second, CPA often occurs in volatile 
political environments (Barron et al., 2016) that are similar to the fast-paced contemporary 
environments that have necessitated BD strategies (Akoka et al., 2017; McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson, 2012). Despite these potential connections, research has yet to unpack the 
 
1 There are two types of environments that affect business operations – market and nonmarket. The market environment 
consists of suppliers, customers, and competitors who directly affect a firm’s economic performance. The nonmarket 
environment consists of social and political stakeholders whose impact is relatively indirect but nonetheless important for 
firms’ overall performance. 
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linkages between information and CPA. For instance, though we know that information is 
useful for lobbying, we do not yet know how information influences the way CPA is 
organized or even the political capabilities that information generates. In this current age of 
data deluge (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016), we contend that this is an opportune time to explore 
the interrelationships between data, information and firms’ activities in political 
environments.   
In this theory paper, we draw on the resource-based view (Barney, 1991) and 
capabilities literature (Winter, 2003; Teece et al., 1997) to develop a conceptual model that 
outlines how the levers of CPA success stimulate BD investments, which subsequently 
allows us to show how the quest for successful CPA (e.g. policy influence, firm performance) 
drives BD strategies. In effect, we postulate CPA as an antecedent of BD. We also theorize 
how BD can be used to develop political capabilities – generally defined as the ability to 
assess policy risk and manage the policy-making process (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). We 
hold a view that political strategies are not developed and deployed merely because firms 
have access to data. Rather, they are consciously developed to influence government policy, a 
purpose for which data are useful (Brown, 2017). 
In this paper we make three contributions to the BD and CPA literatures. First, we 
articulate that political depth, political multidexterity and political agility are CPA success 
factors that eventually stimulate BD investments. In doing so, we address the lack of research 
on the requirements for successful CPA. Though there is a plethora of studies on CPA 
antecedents (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011; Lawton et al., 2013a; Schuler, 1996), 
antecedents are merely indicators of political strategy intensity or choice; they are not 
determinants of CPA success. Effectively, we highlight a difference between doing CPA and 
doing effective CPA, and we contribute to the latter by proposing the requirements for 
successful CPA.  
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Secondly, our conceptualization addresses the lack of research on the antecedents of 
BD investments. Studies have shown that BD is a cycle encompassing data acquisition, 
information extraction, data integration, data modelling and data interpretation (George et al., 
2016; Janssen et al., 2017). We agree with these studies that BD is a cycle, but we challenge 
the common characterization of this cycle as one that starts from data collection. From a 
nonmarket perspective, we theorise a more holistic cycle that tracks BD across a broader 
spectrum, progressing from drivers to outcomes. Specifically, we show how CPA motivates 
investments in BD, thus generating new insights into the nonmarket drivers of BD.  
Thirdly, our conceptual model offers a proximate definition and unpacking of political 
capabilities and shows how BD can be used to develop and deploy unique abilities for policy 
influence and competitive advantage. This contribution is significant as it marks a point 
where our paper departs from previous research. The CPA literature defines political 
capabilities as bundled, aggregated or sets of activities, processes and abilities to network 
with politicians or influence government policy (e.g. Brown, 2016c; e.g. Kotabe et al., 2017; 
Holburn and Zelner, 2010). As such, other than showing that these capabilities are internally 
or externally derived (see Lawton et al., 2013b), CPA scholars have made few attempts to 
unbundle, structure and classify political capabilities. We address this problem by identifying 
three specific political capabilities that are leveraged on BD, and hence contribute to distilling 
and fracturing the political capability construct into more meaningful and distinct 
components. Additionally, by articulating how BD influences the approaches to and levels of 
CPA, we highlight the role of information in political strategy development (see Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999; Barron, 2010; 2011).          
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss 
CPA and political capabilities. We then define Big Data and develop our conceptual model. 
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We conclude by outlining the model’s implications for theory and practice, whilst mapping 
out future research directions.  
2. Corporate Political Activity and Political Capabilities 
CPA refers to efforts exerted by firms to influence government policy (Hillman et al., 2004). 
It occurs in political markets where competing interest groups engage governments for 
preferential policies and treatment (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Grasse et al., 2016; Gray 
and Lowery, 1988; McKay and Yackee, 2007).  CPA entails various strategies, including 
lobbying, recruitment of ex-politicians, personal ties to politicians, campaign contributions 
and donations, press conferences, and advocacy advertising (see Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Peng and Luo, 2000). CPA has gained in importance due to the 
expanding effect that government actions and inactions have on firms (Liedong et al., 2015). 
Instead of being spectators in the policy making process, firms are increasingly contributing 
to public governance to create conducive business environments (Liedong et al., 2017). 
In the search for instrumentality, a plethora of CPA research focuses on how political 
strategies affect firms and interest groups, with a particular emphasis placed on operating and 
stock performances (Sun et al., 2015; Zheng et al., 2015) as well as policy change (Nelson 
and Yackee, 2012; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Empirical evidence suggests an 
overwhelmingly positive impact of CPA on firm performance (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015), 
but with pockets of negative effects on corporate governance (Chaney et al., 2011; Hadani 
and Schuler, 2013; e.g. Liedong and Rajwani, 2018; Sun et al., 2016), risk exposure (Liedong 
et al., 2017) and financing (Bliss and Gul, 2012).  
Though we have come to accept and even actively promote corporate participation in 
politics and public policy, not all firms are politically engaged. There is heterogeneity in 
firms’ ability to influence their political environments (Capron and Chatain, 2008). Studies of 
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the antecedents of CPA have shed light on various firm-level, industry-level and institutional 
characteristics that determine the level of political activity among firms and interest groups 
(e.g. Barron, 2011; Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman and Keim, 1995; Schuler et al., 2002). 
However, firm level variables such as sales (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000), assets (Meznar and 
Nigh, 1995) and market share (Schuler, 1996), which collectively represent resource 
endowment (Wan and Hillman, 2006), seem to be the foremost determinants of CPA 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Liedong and Frynas, 2018). Consequently, large firms are more 
politically active due to their ability to use vast resources to develop and implement political 
strategies to defend their market positions (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Masters and Keim, 
1985). 
 The focus on resources as a major determinant of political activity has spurred the 
popularity of RBV (Barney, 1991) in CPA research (Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Lawton et 
al., 2013a, 2013b), not only to explore the antecedents of political activity, but also for 
theorizing how political activity can be used to gain competitive advantage (e.g. Capron and 
Chatain, 2008; McWilliams et al., 2002). RBV explains competitive heterogeneity as a 
function of the differences in firms’ resource endowments arising from resource market 
imperfections and managerial discretions (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). It argues that firms gain competitive advantage by owning and using 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources to extract rent or isolate themselves 
from value capture (Barney, 1991). This perspective has traditionally been applied to market 
resources but is equally valid for nonmarket resources which include, most importantly, 
information.     
However, resources alone do not create competitive advantage. The presence of assets 
does not necessarily lead to superior performance. Instead, value creation is based on the 
capabilities that firms are able to develop and deploy from resource bundles. In this respect, 
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the RBV proposes that value is derived from two complementary mechanisms – resource 
picking and capability building (Makadok, 2001). Firms gain advantage by assembling 
resources that allow them to develop capabilities (Sirmon et al., 2007). Therefore, capabilities 
are a “firm’s capacity to deploy resources” (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993: 35). The 
capabilities literature further differentiates between ordinary capabilities and dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003; Winter, 2003). The former 
“enable a firm to make a living in the present” while the latter “enables a firm to alter how it 
currently makes a living” (Helfat and Winter, 2011: 1244).  
Both ordinary and dynamic capabilities have been noted in CPA research. Scholars 
have recognized that firms need political capabilities to successfully conduct CPA (Kotabe et 
al., 2017; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Brown, 2016b; Yasuda and Mitsuhashi, 2017). Political 
capabilities are defined as “dynamic processes by which a firm influences or complies with 
its political environment for the purpose of generating future value or protecting the current 
value of the firm from future loss or erosion” (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008: 497). In a broader 
sense, they refer to “non-ad hoc activities and processes oriented toward value creation or 
maintenance of the firm’s political environment” (Brown, 2016c: 267). These capabilities are 
leveraged on firms’ political resources such as money, time, information, lobbyists, political 
connections, public affairs departments, and membership in trade associations (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994; Dahan, 2005; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Frynas et al., 2006). Due to the 
often turbulent nature of political environments (Barron et al., 2016), political capabilities 
must be dynamic to enable firms to respond to external changes in their nonmarket 
environments (Lawton et al., 2013b).  
 A review of the literature shows relatively sparse research on political capabilities; 
only a few studies have explicitly investigated or made references to the construct (Brown, 
2016b; 2017; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011; Lawton, et al., 2013b). This paucity of research 
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could be due to two reasons. First, CPA scholars seem to treat political resources and political 
capabilities homogeneously, in defiance of the dichotomy articulated by previous scholars 
(Makadok, 2001). For instance, there is an implicit assumption that firms with political 
connections can influence government or shape policy. This may be true only if the 
connections (social capital) are turned into political capabilities. For example, the ability to 
collect timely and accurate political information to lobby governments. Second, the lack of 
mediation in CPA studies has made it difficult to find or articulate empirical evidence of the 
mechanisms that translate political connections or activity into positive or negative outcomes 
in political markets (Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). Mechanisms may indicate capabilities. For 
instance, Guo et al.’s (2014) study of CPA mediation suggests that the ability to recognize 
business opportunities and build support from government are political capabilities. 
 A more important shortcoming in the literature is that studies often treat political 
capabilities as a bundle. As a result, there have been limited attempts to disaggregate, unwrap 
or unbundle what “capabilities” are in political markets. While some scholars have advanced 
that political capabilities could be internal or external to the firm (Lawton et al., 2013b; 
Lawton and Rajwani, 2011) and others have shown how firms develop political capabilities 
(Brown, 2016a; 2016c; Elsahn and Benson-Rea, 2018), there is still a poor understanding of 
the specific capabilities that firms deploy.  
 Of particular relevance to this paper is the paucity of specific information-based 
political capabilities, despite the literature identifying and acknowledging information as a 
capability lever. Capabilities are information-based, in the sense that they are developed 
through information creation and sharing (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Although the CPA 
literature has appreciated the importance of information in political influence (Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999; Lawton et al., 2014), it has surprisingly not articulated proximate political 
capabilities that firms can nurture and deploy from data. 
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3. Big Data 
BD has several definitions and interpretations (Sheng et al., 2017), as it is still emerging 
(Wamba, F. S. et al., 2015), quite nascent (Gandomi and Haider, 2015) and evolving 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). For example, Janssen et al. (2017: 338) describe it as 
“datasets that are both big and high in variety and velocity, which makes them difficult to 
handle using traditional tools and techniques” while Mazzei and Noble (2017: 406) define it 
as “large, diverse, complex, and/or longitudinal data sets generated from a variety of 
instruments, sensors, and/or computer-based transactions.” More succinctly, Gartner Inc. 
describe BD as “high volume, high velocity and/or high variety information assets that 
demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing that enable enhanced 
insight, decision making, and process automation.” Table 1 summarizes some of the 
important definitions of BD. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------------- 
Despite the inconsistencies, various definitions touch on some common tenets that 
distinguish BD from ordinary data (Kubina et al., 2015), thus leading to a consensus 
regarding BD’s core dimensions. These dimensions include Volume, Variety, and Velocity, 
which are collectively called the “3Vs”. They have been used by an increasing number of 
scholars to describe and delineate the scope of BD (Chen, H. et al., 2012; Davenport et al., 
2012; Erevelles et al., 2016; Hofacker et al., 2016; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012; Russom, 
2011; Sheng et al., 2017). Though additional characteristics have been propounded to further 
enrich the conceptualization of BD, such as Value, Variability, Visualization, and Veracity 
(Gandomi and Haider, 2015; Malthouse and Li, 2017; Sivarajah et al., 2017), they are, at 
best, extensions of the “3Vs”. Therefore, our conceptual model uses the “3Vs” which we 
describe below:  
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 Volume: this refers to the magnitude of the data. There is no minimum threshold for 
the size of data that qualifies to be called BD (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011; Sheng et al., 
2017), partly as “big” varies with industry type and with technological advancements over 
time (Gandomi and Haider, 2015; Lee, 2017). Nevertheless, it is widely believed that BD 
entails large and rich datasets spanning terabytes, petabytes, zettabytes or even more 
(McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012; Sivarajah et al., 2017). 
Variety: this dimension captures the heterogeneity of BD. Datasets could be 
structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Sheng et al., 2017). Structured data are organized 
in tabular form (such as spread sheets), but this represents a very small proportion of data 
worldwide (Gandomi and Haider, 2015). Much of the data generated is unstructured, such as 
text, images, audio and videos generated by social media, surveillance cameras, GPS signals, 
electronic devices, etc. (Lee, 2017; Sivarajah et al., 2017).  
 Velocity: this refers to the speed at which data are generated. With significant 
technological advancements recorded over the past years, the frequency of data creation has 
increased. Digital devices such as sensors and smart phones have spurred the rate at which 
data are transmitted (Lee, 2017).  
Drawing insights from previous studies, we define BD as large amounts of 
heterogeneous data persistently generated in real time from multiple and diversified sources, 
which can enhance insight and decision-making when processed with advanced technology 
and analytical capabilities. Our definition is underpinned by the “3Vs” and will serve as the 
basis for our conceptual model (Figure 1). 
---------------------------- 





4. Corporate Political Activity and Big Data  
CPA comprises various strategies, including constituency-building, financial and information 
strategies (see Hillman, A. J. and Hitt, 1999). Among these, information strategy is the 
closest to Big Data. It entails “efforts by political professionals or company executives to 
establish communication channels with regulatory bodies, regulators and their staffs” (Keim 
and Zeithaml, 1986: 830) for lobbying or petitioning policy issues (Lenway and Rehbein, 
1991; Lord, 1995). In this strategy, “the good provided is information” (Hillman, A. J. and 
Hitt, 1999: 834). Therefore, our conceptualization of CPA is predominantly based on 
information strategy. However, we note that other strategies also utilize information. For 
instance, firms use information to influence and build constituencies and coalitions (Bonardi 
and Keim, 2005; Lord, 2003). They also use information to make other political decisions, 
such as “which lobbyists to hire or which politicians to financially support” (Brown, 2016a: 
64). According to Ken Cohen at Exxon Mobil’s Political Action Committee (PAC), “when 
making contributions, we seek out candidates who have a history of supporting open markets, 
understand business, and have demonstrated a willingness to hear the facts involved in a 
particular debate” (Richter, 2014: 136). Firms do not only examine historical data, but they 
also monitor new information and review their decisions when necessary, sometimes cutting 
ties with previously supported candidates. Consequently, we assert that most political 
strategies draw on information, which makes data an important requirement for orchestrating 
CPA. We acknowledge that some firms may outsource their CPA to third parties and 
organizations (Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Lord, 1995; Lawton and Rajwani, 2011), hence our 
theorization (Figure 1) is based on firms that internalize their CPA. 
4.1 CPA Success Factors 
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There are certain Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that must exist to facilitate strategic 
success. CSFs are defined as “the limited number of areas in which results, if they are 
satisfactory, will insure successful competitive performance for the organization…they are 
the few areas where ‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish” (Rockart, 1979: 85). 
They are also defined as the “characteristics, conditions, or variables that when properly 
sustained, maintained, or managed can have a significant impact on the success of a firm 
competing in a particular industry” (Leidecker and Bruno, 1984: 24).  
CSFs have received considerable attention in management research (Cummings and 
Holmberg, 2012; Hietschold et al., 2014; Kumar et al., 2018; Jenster, 1987). However, 
scholars have yet to explore the specific CSFs for CPA. Drawing on Rajwani and Liedong 
(2015), we define successful CPA as the favorable outcomes of political strategies. These 
comprise positive operating and stock performance as well as policy influence. For successful 
CPA, firms need accurate and insightful political information (Figueiredo, 2002; Lawton et 
al., 2014). They also need to collect political information from diverse sources to develop 
informed positions. Further, they must be able to monitor and respond to changes in the 
political environment. These requirements lead us to propose three CSFs for successful CPA, 
namely political depth, political multidexterity and political agility. In the next section, we 
discuss these CSFs in detail.  
4.2 Political Depth and CPA Success 
The ability to exploit external information plays an important role in CPA. However, not all 
firms are equally able to process information. While some have higher thresholds, others 
easily become inundated with new information, to a point where they suffer from information 
overload (Hemp, 2009; Ayyagari et al., 2011).  Coen and Levinthal (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990: 128) explain that the “ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external 
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information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” is vital for success. This ability 
captures firms’ capacity to absorb information, which has been widely applied in general 
management research (Zahra and George, 2002; Lane et al., 2006; Song et al., 2018) but has 
seen minimal use in CPA studies. We leverage this understanding to introduce political 
depth, which we define as the ability of a firm to absorb, process and utilize large volumes of 
information for the purpose of managing its political environment. Political depth is a 
requirement for successful CPA. 
There is opportunity for firms to influence national policy-making (Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010), but the firms that are able to exploit this opportunity usually have the capacity 
to collect and process volumes of information (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). CPA occurs within 
political markets (Bonardi et al., 2005) that are characterized by demanders and supplies 
(Kingsley et al., 2012). On the demand side are firms, interest groups, political parties, trade 
associations and organized voters who advocate for their respective policy preferences, and 
on the supply side are politicians and government agencies who determine what preferences 
to consider or address (Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman and Keim, 1995). In these markets, just 
as in economic markets, there is exchange and interaction between demanders and suppliers. 
However, the media of exchange in political markets goes beyond money or goods and 
services (in the case of barter trade or quid pro quo) to include information on policy issues 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
Regulators need a high degree of information to formulate policy (Bonardi et al., 
2006), and they often engage stakeholders, including firms, in the consultation process 
(Rajwani and Liedong, 2015; McKay and Yackee, 2007). To influence the outcomes of this 
process, firms supply regulators with information (Lagerlof, 1997) which they collect by 
commissioning research on policy issues (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) or by scanning the 
environment for policy developments (Lawton et al., 2014). Hence, firms that have the ability 
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to collect and assimilate more information are more likely to produce quality evidence, make 
compelling cases and have higher chances of success (Lenway et al., 1990; Lenway and 
Rehbein, 1991).  
The multiplicity of policy issues confronting firms at any point in time suggests that 
politically active firms must be research-oriented and have data collection expertise 
embedded in their organizational structures (Coen, 1999). For example, Symantec 
Corporation, a global security firm, faces broad issues which cover many aspects of 
consumer privacy, online safety, data security, and intellectual property protection. These 
issues are addressed by its Government Affairs Department using data to shape conversations 
and outcomes. Many other firms, such as Microsoft, AT&T and JP Morgan, proactively 
monitor and gather information about regulations and emergent issues in order to visualize 
potential threats and opportunities (Lawton et al., 2014; Brown, 2016a). 
Essentially, successful CPA requires firms to formally structure their information 
collection processes using government, corporate, or public affairs departments (Liedong et 
al., 2017; Wartick and Rude, 1986). Doing so gives them the capacity to collect, process and 
share quality information in ways that advance their interests (Baron, 1995a; Lawton et al., 
2013), such as altering public perceptions on policy issues (Bonardi and Keim, 2005) or 
shaping regulatory outcomes (Ban and You, 2019; Bonardi et al., 2006; McKay and Yackee, 
2007). Recognizing the value of information in CPA, Lawton et al. (2014) developed an 
information value pack which, among other things, articulates the importance of building 
information networks (De Fouloy, 2001) and using robust data (Caulkin and Collins, 2003). 
The foregoing arguments show that CPA thrives on firms’ ability to absorb large volumes of 
political information. We therefore propose that: 
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Proposition 1: As firms collect and absorb large volumes of data, they are more likely 
to increase political depth and ensure CPA success 
4.3 Political Multidexterity and CPA Success 
Successful organizations can manage evolutionary and revolutionary change by being able to 
“simultaneously pursue both incremental and discontinuous innovation” (Tushman and 
O'Reilly, 1996: 24) or “dynamically balance exploration and exploitation” (Luger et al., 
2018: 449). This ability is widely known as ambidexterity (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013; 
Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; Turner et al., 2013). Ambidextrous organizations can 
simultaneously refine existing knowledge (exploitation) while developing new knowledge 
(exploration) (Levinthal and March, 1993; Gupta et al., 2006). This is instrumental for 
gaining competitive advantage (Aoki and Wilhelm, 2017; Raisch et al., 2009; Prieto and 
Pilar, 2012). Ambidexterity is a capability that is significantly influenced by information 
(Filippini et al., 2012).  
In political arenas, ambidexterity would entail managing current political issues whilst 
learning to avoid or deal with future ones. This seems quite simplistic, considering that 
managing the political environment consists of many agendas. For instance, firms need to 
scan the environment, identify policy issues and key stakeholders, develop and implement 
strategies, and monitor progress. Hence, we use the term multidexterity to capture the 
multitude agenda of CPA. Taking a cue from previous studies (e.g. Ritter and Geersbro, 
2018), we introduce and define political multidexterity as the ability of a firm to collect, 
analyze and interpret information existing in various formats and from various sources for the 
purpose of managing its political environment. Political multidexterity is a CSF for CPA. It is 
a capability that underlies strategic issues management (SIM), which refers to the method or 
process by which firms identify, evaluate and respond to social and political issues that affect 
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them (Ansoff, 1980; Crable and Vibbert, 1985; Dutton and Ottensmeyer, 1987; Mahon and 
Waddock, 1992). SIM aims to minimize shocks arising from political changes. These 
changes can be identified through “scanning and tracking of publications, public opinion 
polls and management opinion surveys” (Wartick and Rude, 1986: 132). Clearly, surveillance 
and information gathering from diverse sources are crucial in SIM and importantly, these 
activities are supported by political multidexterity.       
The multi-faceted nature of politics requires politically active firms to gather a variety 
of data and information from a multitude of sources. Political environments are made up of 
many stakeholders and interest groups including politicians, regulators, organizations, the 
media, organized voters, communities and non-governmental organizations (Liedong et al., 
2015). These stakeholders may have different policy interests, and hence trade in political 
markets to promote their respective positions and preferences (Baumgartner et al., 2009; 
Bonardi et al., 2006; Bonardi et al., 2005; Kingsley et al., 2012). Their activity in political 
markets affect other actors in various ways. First, success in political markets does not 
depend only on the strength of a firm’s arguments, but also on the strength of other interest 
groups’ arguments (Baron, 1995b). Second, in political markets, politicians’ discretion to 
grant favors to firms is limited when other stakeholders show interest in policy issues 
(Bonardi et al., 2005). Third, politicians are not always the source of regulations; there are 
instances when pressure group advocacy may draw attention to issues that have implications 
for firms (Liedong et al., 2017). As such, to succeed in CPA, firms must collate and assess 
data from a variety of stakeholders and competing interest groups (Darendeli and Hill, 2016; 
Becker, 1983).  
Successful CPA also requires firms to collect and disseminate information on social 
and political issues via various sources, including “face-to-face meetings, communication 
networks, electronic document exchange and telephone conversations” (Lawton, et al., 2014: 
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p. 138). The role of social media in CPA is particularly crucial. Across developing and 
developed countries, social media participation is strongly related to political activism 
(Bekkers et al., 2011; Valenzuela et al., 2012). Twitter and Facebook shape citizens’ protest 
behavior, mainly serving as sources of information, platforms for expressing political 
opinion, and fora for joining political groups (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011; Valenzuela, 
2013). They allow stakeholders to expand their contact bases, build strong constituencies and 
scale up social movements for political causes (Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012). They are also a 
source of political learning and engagement (Shah et al., 2007), as they allow people to 
grapple with ideas and reflect on information (Valenzuela, 2013). The Arab Spring and 
Occupy Wall Street movement attest to the power of social media in mobilizing grassroots. In 
the U.S., which arguably records the highest level of CPA in the world, Twitter has become a 
major platform for learning about government policy since Donald Trump became President. 
Politically successful firms should therefore be able to use social media to scan the 
nonmarket environment, gauge policy movements, and wield influence. For example, Bryan 
Miller who was Senior Vice-President of Public Policy at Sunrun, a residential solar company 
in the U.S, found social media useful for referencing congressional or senate discussions and 
for timely interventions in renewable energy legislation (Kokalitcheva, 2016). As social 
media content ranges from text, video and audio to photographs, we postulate that firms must 
be able to handle these various data formats to succeed in CPA.   
Proposition 2: As firms collect, analyze and interpret political information from 






4.4 Political Agility and CPA Success 
To gain or sustain competitive advantage in today’s hypercompetitive business environment, 
organizations must continuously adapt to changing and uncertain environments (Junni et al., 
2015; Nemkova, 2017). This is called strategic agility, defined as “the ability to remain 
flexible in facing new developments, to continuously adjust the company’s strategic 
direction, and to develop innovative ways to create value” (Weber and Tarba, 2014: 5). 
Strategic agility is a dynamic capability (Fourne et al., 2014; Teece et al., 2016) founded on 
strategic sensitivity, leadership unity and resource fluidity (Doz and Kosonen, 2008). Some 
scholars have argued that political capabilities are dynamic processes (e.g. Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008). Building on their work, we introduce the notion of political agility, which 
we define as the ability of a firm to manage high-velocity information, reconfigure resources 
and orchestrate timely political strategies in response to changes in the political environment. 
We advance that political agility is a requirement for successful CPA.   
The frequency of data collection is very important for CPA (Barron et al., 2016; 
Lawton et al., 2014). This is because political environments are often volatile and susceptible 
to changes. Firms are not only exposed to political instability and regime changes (Decker, 
2011), but also to the pressures of powerful social movements which are able to reach critical 
mass through the dynamics of technology and social media (Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012). 
Government policy risk - the risk that government will change policies to directly or 
indirectly affect firms’ operations and performance (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Liedong et 
al., 2017; Miller, 1992) – is a threat that affects firms. This risk is shaped by different interest 
groups competing for influence in volatile and dynamic political markets (Bonardi et al., 
2005; Kingsley et al., 2012; McKay and Yackee, 2007).  
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Consequently, politically active firms operate in fast-paced political environments 
where success requires a timely and proactive approach to issues (see Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Baysinger et al., 1985; Meznar and Nigh, 1995). In other words, firms need a high degree of 
political agility to succeed. The frequency of information gathering and exchange is thus 
crucial for political influence (Bouwen, 2002; Coen, 1999) and can determine performance 
outcomes (Lawton and Rajwani, 2011). Therefore, we propose that:   
Proposition 3: As firms collect, analyze and interpret fast-paced political information, 
they are more likely to increase political agility and ensure CPA success. 
4.5 CPA Success Factors and Big Data 
We argued in previous sections that political depth, political multidexterity and political 
agility are requirements, capabilities or CSFs that firms need to be successful in political 
markets. In this section, the three CPA CSFs are aligned with the three dimensions of BD (the 
3Vs - volume, variety, and velocity). Political depth is linked to data volume, political 
multidexterity is linked to data variety and political agility is linked to data velocity. We 
argue that these linkages between the CPA CSFs and BD make the former serve as 
antecedents of the latter. Two perspectives inform our argument.    
First, firms that want to do successful CPA must develop capabilities around the 
success factors. Having developed these capabilities, they are more likely to find it easier to 
manage BD, which will subsequently impact their decision to invest in BD. This perspective 
positions the success factors as facilitators of BD investments. Second, firms that want to 
pursue successful CPA will need data and information to gain political depth and be 
politically agile and multidextrous. Considering the close alignment between the success 
factors and BD, this need will make BD investments necessary. Similarly, successful CPA 
will require political agility which, in turn, will require collecting and responding to fast-
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paced information. Contrary to the first, this second perspective positions the CPA CSFs as 
outcomes that necessitate BD investments. Combining the two perspectives, we argue that 
political agility, political multidexterity and political agility facilitate and necessitate BD 
strategies. We advance that it is imperative for politically active firms to collect high volume, 
fast-paced and varied data to succeed in political markets. This imperative gives rise to BD 
investments.  
Proposition 4: Political depth, political multidexterity and political agility facilitate 
and necessitate Big Data investments and serve as antecedents of Big Data 
5. The Impact of Big Data on Corporate Political Activity 
5.1 Big Data and the Approach to CPA 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) noted that the first decision a firm must make when developing a 
political strategy is its general approach. Firms have two options. The first is to do CPA in 
response to specific policy or political issues (Buchholz, 1992). This is the transactional 
approach whereby firms conduct reactive CPA on an issue-by-issues (ad hoc) basis. The 
second option is to do CPA by building and leveraging political relationships to influence 
political and policy issues on an on-going basis. A major difference between the relational 
and transactional approaches is that while the former utilizes a long-term orientation, the 
latter is short-term (Barron, 2011; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Relational approaches are 
increasingly demonstrated by the creation and use of government/public affairs or relations 
departments, units and functions for managing external issues (Johnson, 1996; Wartick and 
Rude, 1986).    
 Research has argued that the choice of approach depends on the extent of a firm’s 
dependency on government, its level of product diversification, and the degree of 
corporatism/pluralism in its operating environment (Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Keim, 
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1995). Other studies have used diverse national cultural dimensions to explain CPA 
approaches (e.g. Barron, 2010; 2011). However, the role of information in this important 
decision has been overlooked. Consequently, we argue that BD influences whether a firm 
uses a relational or transactional approach.  
Specifically, we advance that BD makes a relational approach more likely and 
perhaps even stronger in terms of intensity. This is because a relational approach requires 
exchange relationships that are built on trust between firms and policy makers/politicians 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999). This requirement is relatively weaker in a transactional approach. 
For policy makers to trust a firm, they must be convinced that the firm is a supplier of 
accurate and reliable policy-related information. Such information also increases the chances 
of successful CPA (Figueiredo, 2002; Lenway and Rehbein, 1991). We thus argue that BD 
investments enable firms to gather rich and real-time information that can be used to 
convincingly articulate policy preferences and implications. In this sense, BD serves as a 
resource for quality information and a lever for trust building in political markets and may 
also be useful for the development of social capital between firms and the polity. As trust is 
built, cooperative exchange between both parties becomes possible, leading to a reduction in 
the transaction costs of policy making and policy influence.  
Moreover, firms that invest in BD are also likely to invest in structures and functions 
to help generate value from the data. Such functions would include government relations and 
public affairs departments or offices. As Hillman and Hitt (1999) noted, these offices imply a 
firm’s regular interest in government relations and signify a relational approach to CPA. 
Furthermore, BD provides a resource for the effective performance of government relations 
departments, which reinforces a relational approach.  Thus, we assert that: 
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Proposition 5: Big Data can make politically active firms more likely to use a 
relational approach than a transactional approach in their political activity.  
5.2 Big Data and the Level of CPA 
According to Olson (1965), there are two levels of participation in political issues, namely 
collective and individual actions. The former entails collaboration between two or more 
firms. This level of activity is representative in the lobbying activities of trade associations 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Rajwani et al., 2015). The latter refers to the solitary efforts of 
organizations to influence government policy. The choice between individual and collective 
levels of participation is contingent on firms’ financial endowment, the nature of the political 
issues and the culture of the business environment (Chong, 1991; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Murtha and Lenway, 1994). Again, the impact of data or information in this choice has been 
overlooked.  
Building on previous studies, we assert that BD affects CPA participation levels, and 
particularly makes individual action more likely. We agree with Hillman and Hitt (1999) that 
financial resources affect the choice of individual versus collective action, but we observe 
that their focus on only financial resources is narrow because information is an equally 
valuable resource in political markets (Kingsley et al., 2012; Lawton et al., 2014). Regulators 
depend on it to make optimal decisions while firms use it to develop their political strategies. 
Therefore, firms that have accurate and reliable information wield significant influence on 
policy making. In this sense, a firm with BD will likely pursue individual action because it 
has a valuable resource at its disposal, just as a firm with financial resources will. With BD, 
firms can make informed decisions and reach satisfactory agreements with other actors in 
political markets. By this argument, we also advance that collective action is more likely to 
be pursued when individual firms lack information or the ability to collect information.   
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 Previous studies have also argued that the choice of individual or collective action 
may be dependent on firms’ negotiation preferences and managerial cultural socialization 
(Barron, 2010; 2011). Managers in individualistic countries tend to adopt a competitive view 
of negotiation and may thus pursue individual action. The reverse is true for managers in 
collectivist countries (Cai et al., 2000; Drake, 2001). While we agree with these cultural 
effects on distributive and integrative bargaining preferences - competitive and collaborative 
negotiation respectively - we also assert that information affects such preferences. Firms that 
possess more information may have lower levels of dependency on other actors and may thus 
have a stronger inclination to pursue individual political action. Moreover, possession of 
valuable information may reduce the likelihood of collaboration and instead invoke 
competitive tendencies aimed at benefiting idiosyncratic gains in political markets. Overall, 
we argue that BD increases the pursuit of individual political action.    
Proposition 6: Big Data can make politically active firms more likely to pursue 
individual action instead of collective action in political markets.  
5.3 Big Data and Political Capabilities 
There is a plethora of research about the value of BD in the market environment (e.g. Barton 
and Court, 2012; Erevelles et al., 2016; Hofacker et al., 2016; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 
2012; Malthouse and Li, 2017), but less in the nonmarket environment. We assert that BD 
creates value in political markets too. While previous studies have acknowledged the 
importance of information as a resource for political influence (Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; 
Lawton et al., 2014), they have fallen short of specifying the exact capabilities that are 
developed from data or information.  
BD is a valuable resource in CPA, mainly as it provides the basis for developing, 
enhancing and deploying nuanced data-driven political capabilities. Here, we disaggregate 
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political capabilities into two types – internal and external. Internal political capabilities refer 
to the processes through which departments, business units or subsidiaries influence final 
decisions within large and diversified firms (e.g. Shaffer and Hillman, 2000). External 
political capabilities refer to the processes through which firms, as whole units, influence 
external politics. Our focus is on how BD affects the latter through three capabilities – 
political intelligence, political clout and data politicization.   
In today’s knowledge economy, business intelligence is a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage (Schoemaker and Tetlock, 2017). While business intelligence could 
span across market and nonmarket environments, the term has mainly been used in reference 
to market processes. We advance that BD enables firms to develop political intelligence, 
which we define as the ability to collect and transform data into information, knowledge and 
strategies for influencing political processes and political environments. The quality of 
political intelligence is contingent on the volume and frequency of data collected, and the 
organizational structures and technologies used to process data.   
Firms that invest in BD can learn more about their political environments. For 
instance, social media data enables firms to monitor and learn about opinions, trends and 
sentiments regarding policy issues. This knowledge can be used to develop political strategies 
to exploit political markets or to take positions that satisfy majority groups in order to avoid 
backlash. In this sense, BD may enable firms to gauge stakeholders’ reactions to their CPA, 
which will help them to be timely, punctilious and systematic in their political strategizing.  
 Besides political intelligence, we also note that politically active firms sometimes 
resort to coalitions and grassroots mobilization to influence policy issues (see Baysinger et 
al., 1985; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). For firms to build coalitions, they need political clout, 
which we define as the ability to gain stakeholder support and develop powerful collective or 
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mass movements for policy influence. We argue that in this era of data deluge and technology 
explosion, BD makes it easier to build political coalitions. Political and advocacy advertising 
(Keim and Zeithaml, 1986) can reach a lot of people via social media, and firms can 
conveniently organize social movements and influence public opinions for or against policy 
decisions. Social media, a large source of BD, promotes political learning and engagement 
among citizens (Shah et al., 2007; Shah et al., 2005) and provides a convenient platform for 
people to join political causes (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011). Firms may thus harvest BD to 
develop political clout for building strong constituencies of people to shape government 
policy. Essentially, BD facilitates grassroots lobbying by mobilizing the public for political 
action.    
 Further, BD can be used to deploy data politicization – i.e. the ability to share or sell 
data collected from individuals and organizations to politicians or political parties in return 
for political favors or preferential treatment. With this capability, firms are able to achieve 
their political goals by allowing the polity to use their data for targeted political messaging or 
marketing. The scandal involving Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm 
which illegally mined Facebook data to influence electoral outcomes, noticeably brought this 
capability to the fore. Consistent with the notion of exchange relations between demanders 
and suppliers in political markets (Bonardi et al., 2005; Capron and Chatain, 2008), 
politicians may offer resource or policy favors to BD firms in return for access to electorate 
information for various purposes, including targeted advertising.  
Though there are rules and ethics regarding the collection, use and sharing of 
subscriber or customer information (Moore et al., 2015; Charters, 2002), there are also 
exceptions. For instance, in the U.K, local councils monetize data by selling individuals’ 
information to political parties, lobbyists, estate agents and other organizations (Dutta, 2013). 
In developing countries where privacy and data rules are not strictly enforced (Hossain and 
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Dwivedi, 2014) and where political stakes are usually high, firms can share customer data 
with politicians. In this context, phone numbers (for mass texting) and emails are valuable 
assets firms can trade to politicians in exchange for rent or policy favors. Based on the 
foregoing, we assert that BD may lead to the development of unique data-driven political 
capabilities.   
Proposition 7a: Firms that invest in Big Data are more likely to have superior 
political intelligence capabilities. 
Proposition 7b: Firms that invest in Big Data are more likely to have superior 
political clout capabilities. 
Proposition 7c: Firms that invest in Big Data are more likely to have superior data 
politicization capabilities. 
 
6. Discussion  
This paper demonstrates the need to understand the relationship between big data and CPA. 
We presented three factors - political depth, political multidexterity and political agility - that 
are critical to the success of CPA. We then argued that these factors will drive BD 
investments. We also advanced that CPA may serve as an antecedent of BD. Our stance 
resonates with the fact that information is a valuable asset for political influence (Figueiredo, 
2002; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Lawton et al., 2014). It also connects with the reality that 
politically active firms need to collect and manage high-volume information on a multitude 
of issues in their political environments (requiring political depth), make sense of varied data 
from various interest groups in political markets (requiring political multidexterity), and cope 
with real-time political and social movements in volatile and dynamic political markets 
(requiring political agility). These requirements are aligned with the most popular and widely 
articulated BD tenets – Volume, Variety and Velocity (Davenport et al., 2012; McAfee and 
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Brynjolfsson, 2012), which caused us to postulate that CPA facilitates and necessitates BD 
investments. We also argued that BD provides a valuable resource for developing data-driven 
political capabilities that enable firms to learn about political issues and gauge public opinion 
(i.e. political intelligence), build constituencies and exploit social and political movements 
(i.e. political clout), and use information resources for leverage in political dealings (i.e. data 
politicization). These capabilities reinforce CPA success. 
Our paper contributes to BD and CPA literatures by using a theoretical framework 
that accounts for the different aspects of political capabilities and several critical success 
factors. First, we extend the treatise of BD beyond its current narrow trajectory by advancing 
how CPA drives BD investments, as well as how BD shapes the organization of CPA and 
provides a launch pad for developing data-driven political capabilities. As such, this paper 
provides new insights that add to the CPA and BD literatures through positing the linkages 
between data and political activity. Second, from the capabilities literature (Teece et al., 
1997), we extend Oliver and Holzinger’s (2008) connotation of political capabilities as 
“dynamic processes” by showing that these capabilities are not necessarily dynamic in the 
sense that political ties or connections can become liabilities as political environments change 
(e.g. Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2010). Our model posits that political capabilities can be 
described as “dynamic” only if firms can successfully respond to political changes, which is 
highly unlikely without information or data (Brown, 2017). Hence, we suggest that BD or 
information underpins the dynamism of political capabilities.   
Since Oliver and Holzinger’s (2008) seminal political management paper, there have 
been inconsistencies and vagueness about what political capabilities really are. Notable is 
how some studies do not differentiate between political capabilities and political strategies, 
despite the nuance. We acknowledge that some scholars have identified scanning, prediction, 
political relationship management, and institutional influence as capabilities that affect the 
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effectiveness of CPA (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Kotabe et al., 
2017), but we note that they do not show how these capabilities are developed. We also 
acknowledge that other scholars have identified information as an important resource for 
political capabilities (Lawton et al., 2013b), but again, we observe that they are less clear 
about how information is transformed into a political capability. In a more recent study, 
Brown (2016c) described the process of building political capability using four factors 
inherent in CPA, namely corporate structure (e.g. a Washington D.C. office), firm-
government linkages (e.g. political directorships), political access (political action 
committees, or PACs) and policy pressures (e.g. lobbying). However, these factors rely on 
informed decision-making which, as we have asserted, constitutes the core of political 
capabilities. For instance, a firm’s decision to develop political networking capabilities in 
emerging markets is a function of the information it collects about institutional voids (Kotabe 
et al., 2017). Therefore, through theorizing the use of data to gain political intelligence, build 
political clout and execute data politicization, our paper contributes to a more proximate 
unpacking of political capabilities.      
In terms of practical relevance, our paper suggests that BD can be valuable for CPA. 
BD could be used to sharpen political capabilities in nonmarket environments, leading to 
successful CPA, such as policy influence. As prior research also shows that BD enhances 
market performance (e.g. Akter et al., 2016; Erevelles et al., 2016; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 
2012; Wamba et al., 2017), we advance that firms can achieve both market and nonmarket 
outcomes through BD. Essentially, BD could be used to orchestrate an integrated market and 
nonmarket strategy for superior performance and sustainable competitive advantage (Baron, 
1995a).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 here 




6.1 Future Research  
We caution readers about over-generalizing our conceptual model, as there might be 
exceptions to the propositions. For instance, not every politically active firm invests in BD. 
Similarly, financially endowed firms may pursue collective action if the benefits of CPA will 
accrue to other non-participating firms. However, such exceptions should provide the basis 
for further and more finely tuned research on CPA and BD, which we hope this paper will 
motivate. In Table 2, we map the overarching Big Data research gaps and in Table 3, we 
summarize our propositions and link them to future research themes and specific research 
questions that could increase knowledge and understanding of the interlinkages between BD 
and CPA.      
First, we encourage future studies to empirically test the validity and strength of our 
conceptual model. Research could examine the relationships between the CSFs and CPA 
success, with attention paid to the boundary conditions or moderators of these relationships. 
For instance, as we focus on firms that internalize their own CPA, future works could probe 
whether our model will hold for different types of firms in terms of size, structures and 
industries, including political consulting and lobbying firms. We believe that understanding 
the moderators of our propositions will be useful.   
Second, the antecedents of BD initiatives and investments are the least studied, with 
many studies focusing on the definition, analytical and post-implementation capabilities, 
economic value, and management challenges related to BD (Akter et al., 2016; McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson, 2012). Therefore, we believe that there could be other nonmarket drivers of BD 
initiatives besides CPA, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR), which should be 
investigated to increase our understanding of the topic. Even more finely grained analyses 
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could be done by disaggregating CSR into its types and investigating the differential impacts 
of philanthropic, environmental, economic, ethical and diversity CSR activities on BD 
investments. Moreover, further research on the complementary effects of CSR and CPA on 
BD strategies could be a significant extension of the bourgeoning literature on the 
combinative impact of these two main strands of nonmarket strategy (e.g. Hond et al., 2014; 
Liedong et al., 2015; Liedong et al., 2017)   
Third, there are three main components of CPA development, namely: (1) the levels 
of political activity; (2) the approaches to political engagement; and (3) the specific political 
strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Our model proposes the effects of BD on the first two but 
does not account for the third component. Hence, it will be useful for future research to 
investigate how BD affects firms’ choice of political strategies and the intensity of firms’ 
political embeddedness.  
Fourth, it would be insightful to identify and test other data-driven political 
capabilities and their moderators. Considering the potential for data abuse, researchers could 
also explore the ethicality of using BD to enhance political capabilities. This could lead to the 
development of normative guidelines for responsible use of data in CPA. Further, having 
proposed the value of BD in political markets, we encourage future research to examine how 
BD might be useful for developing integrated market and nonmarket strategies. This will help 
to generate useful knowledge of BD’s overall strategic value.  
In conclusion, our study not only contributes to a better understanding of BD in the 
nonmarket context, but it also challenges scholars to broaden the scope of research on the 
topic. We believe that an appreciation of the value of BD in nonmarket environments in 
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Table 1: Panel A – Big Data Definitions  
Study Definition 
Akoka et al. (2017) “Large data sets almost impossible to manage and process using traditional data management 
tools. It refers to various forms of large information sets requiring complex computational 
platforms in order to be analyzed” (p.106) 
 
Davenport et al. (2012) “Expanding sea of data that is either too voluminous or too unstructured to be managed and 
analyzed through traditional means” (p. 43) 
 
Boyd & Crawford (2012) “A cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon that rests on the interplay of technology, 
analysis, and mythology that provokes extensive utopian and dystopian rhetoric” (p. 662) 
 
George et al. (2016) “Large and varied data that can be collected and managed” (p. 1493) 
 
Malthouse & Li (2017) “Data so large and complex that traditional computing environments and data-processing 
methods are inadequate for dealing with them” (p. 227) 
 
Hoffman (2017) “The big data approach, in general, stands for quickly collecting and analyzing large amounts of 
data from numerous different sources in order to improve business decision-making and overall 
performance” (p 5110) 
 
George et al. (2014) “Big data is generated from an increasing plurality of sources, including Internet clicks, mobile 
transactions, user-generated content, and social media as well as purposefully generated content 
through sensor networks or business transactions such as sales queries and purchase 
transactions.” (p. 321) 
 
Sheng et al. (2017) “Extremely large amount of structured, semi structured or unstructured data continuously 
generated from diversified sources, which inundates business operations in real time and impacts 
on decision-making through mining insightful information from rambling data” (p. 98) 
 
Panel B – Big Data Dimensions  
Dimension Example 
Volume “A participant in a Formula 1 car  race generates 20 gigabytes of data from the 150 sensors on 
the car that can help analyze the technical performance of its components, but also the driver 
reactions, pit stop delays, and communication between crew and driver that contribute to overall 
performance” (George et al., 2014: 321).  
 
Walmart collects more than 2.5 petabytes of data every hour from its customer transactions   
(McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute, 2011) 
 
Variety “Through careful application of analytics, Coca-Cola is able to use data from satellite imaging, 
orange growth historical records, and climate indications to standardize the taste of its juices” 
(Mazzei and Noble, 2017: 408) 
 
Velocity  Amazon’s business is modelled on managing a constant flow of new products, suppliers, 
customers and promotions without compromising on delivery, which the company executes 
very well (Davenport, 2006) 
  
“Progressive Insurance is using real-time analytics from in-vehicle telecommunications devices 
to monitor driving activity, creating a competitive advantage by identifying risky behaviors” 





Table 2: Mapping Big Data Research 
  
  Business Environment 
Market Nonmarket 
Antecedents O O 
Outcomes P O 






O = Limited / No research;  P = Significant research 
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Table 3: Mapping the Future Research Directions  
Propositions Future Research Themes/Topics Some Future Research Questions 
• Proposition 1: As firms collect and absorb large volumes of 
data, they are more likely to increase political depth and ensure 
CPA success 
 
• The critical success factors of CPA • What are the boundary conditions (if any) for the relationship 
between political depth and CPA success? 
• What other factors are required for successful CPA and how are 
these factors dependent on information or data?  
 
• Proposition 2: As firms collect, analyze and interpret political 
information from various sources, they are more likely to 
increase political multidexterity and ensure CPA success 
 
• The critical success factors of CPA • What are the boundary conditions (if any) for the relationship 
between political multidexterity and CPA success? 
• What other factors are required for successful CPA and how are 
these factors dependent on information or data?  
 
• Proposition 3: As firms collect, analyze and interpret fast-paced 
political information, they are more likely to increase political 
agility and ensure CPA success. 
 
• The critical success factors of CPA • What are the boundary conditions (if any) for the relationship 
between political agility and CPA success? 
• What other factors are required for successful CPA and how are 
these factors dependent on information or data?  
 
• Proposition 4: Political depth, political multidexterity and 
political agility facilitate and necessitate Big Data investments 
and serve as antecedents of Big Data 
 




• How does corporate social responsibility (and its different 
types) affect Big Data strategies? 
• What is the complementary impact of CPA and CSR on Big 
Data investments? 
 
• Proposition 5: Big Data can make politically active firms more 
likely to use a relational approach than a transactional approach 
in their political activity 
 
• Big Data and political strategy development  • How can Big Data influence the choice and intensity of political 
strategies and tactics? 
• Proposition 6: Big Data can make politically active firms more 
likely to pursue individual action instead of collective action in 
political markets 
 
• Big Data and political strategy development • How can Big Data influence the choice and intensity of political 
strategies and tactics? 
 
• Proposition 7a: Firms that invest in Big Data are more likely to 
have superior political intelligence capabilities. 
 
• Proposition 7b: Firms that invest in Big Data are more likely to 
have superior political clout capabilities. 
 
• Proposition 7c: Firms that invest in Big Data are more likely to 
have superior data politicization capabilities. 
 
• Big Data and political capabilities 
• The ethicality of political capabilities 
• What other political capabilities can be developed or enhanced 
using Big Data? 
• What is the ethicality of using Big Data to develop political 
capabilities? 
• How can Big Data be used to develop integrated market and 
nonmarket strategies? 
• What firm- and/or institutional-level moderators affect data-
driven political capabilities?  






























CPA Success Factors 











Approach to CPA 
 
Level of CPA Participation 
 
Individual Action 
 
Policy Influence 
Market Performance 
Operating Performance 
Successful CPA 
 
Facilitate 
 
Necessitate 
 
Reinforce 
 
